By Deborah Achtenberg
Argues that the significant cognitive section of moral advantage for Aristotle is knowledge of the price of particulars.
With this new interpretation, Deborah Achtenberg argues that metaphysics is principal to ethics for Aristotle and that the ethics might be learn on levels-imprecisely, by way of its personal dialectically grounded and vague claims, or by way of the metaphysical phrases and ideas that provide the ethics higher articulation and intensity. She argues that options of value-the stable and the beautiful-are relevant to ethics for Aristotle and they will be understood by way of telos the place 'telos' could be construed to intend 'enriching limitation' and contrasted with destructive or harmful dilemma. Achtenberg argues that the imprecision of ethics for Aristotle effects no longer easily from the truth that ethics has to do with details, yet extra centrally from the truth that it has to do with the worth of details. She offers new interpretations of a large choice of passages in Aristotle's metaphysical, actual, mental, rhetorical, political, and moral works in help of her argument and compares Aristotle's perspectives to these of Plato, Marcus Aurelius, the Hebrew Bible, Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, Freud, and twentieth-century item kinfolk theorists. Achtenberg additionally responds to interpretations of Aristotle's ethics by means of McDowell, Nussbaum, Sherman, Salkever, Williams, Annas, Irwin, Roche, Gomez-Lobo, Burnyeat, and Anagnostopoulos.
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Additional resources for Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics: Promise of Enrichment, Threat of Destruction (SUNY Series in Ancient Greek Philosophy)
Between receptivity to feeling and actual feeling lies will. By exercising it, I can prevent or allow feeling to be experienced. In the case of sympathetic feeling, I am receptive to the feeling by nature. Through will, I determine whether I will experience the feeling or not. I have a duty to experience the feeling in cases in which I can promote the welfare of the other person supposing that the feeling will aid me in promoting her or his welfare. I ought not experience the feeling in cases in which promotion of the welfare of the other is not possible.
Instead, natural emotional responsiveness is brute and virtue is the fortitude, strength, or will to withstand it. In addition, though virtue or strength is most manifest when exercised to withstand natural emotional response, it can be exercised as well to allow such response. For example, we exercise will both when we allow ourselves to feel sympathetic joy or sadness and also when we prevent ourselves from feeling it. Moreover, we prevent ourselves from feeling an emotion not by cultivating the emotion to make it more responsive or reflective.
For, according to Aristotle, the soul is somehow all the beings (De An. 8 431b20–21). More specifically, in actual perception, perception and the objects of perception are the same—namely, the same in form (De An. 8 431b20–432a1) and, as we know (De An. 7), desire is an activity of perception. If we put together this conclusion—that, in actual desire, desire and the practical good are the same—with the conclusion we just reached, that in actual desire, thought and desire are the same, we can conclude that the causes of animal motion, including human action, are one in form.