By Soraj Hongladarom
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Extra info for A Buddhist Theory of Privacy
8 Adam D. Moore, “Privacy: Its Meaning and Value,” p. 223. 9 Adam D. Moore, “Privacy: Its Meaning and Value,” p. 215. 4 5 40 3 Cultural Attitudes Toward Privacy presumably it is in a public domain in the sense that anybody can look it up and learn about the information without thereby violating the privacy of the person whom the information is about. Parent disagrees with those, such as Fried (1970) and Wasserstom (1979), who argue more toward a “control” conception of privacy where privacy is deﬁned more as the control an individual has over the information related to himself or herself.
Thus it is apparent that Arneson trumps justice over privacy. If there comes to a choice between the two, it seems that one should choose justice ﬁrst. However, it is not clear that privacy and justice have always to be incompatible values. The question whether distributive justice raises its own problems regarding encroachment of individual liberty aside, there does not seem to be any prevailing reason why privacy and justice have to be an either or situation. Arneson’s dilemma apparently rests on the idea that, in order to enact laws and regulations that ensure certain kinds of distributive justice, certain information pertaining to the individuals is required, and this means encroachment on their privacy.
Arguments purporting to justify privacy through conceptions of individual moral worth or human dignity presuppose that individuals are to be accorded these worths because of their ability to think for themselves or to be autonomous cognitive agent. It seems clear that the ability to think for themselves is closely related to the individual’s ability to have their private sphere of thoughts and feelings. It is presumably in virtue of their having their private, individual spheres that individuals are autonomous, thus becoming candidates for moral worth and dignity.